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Mari Hatavara
(University of Tampere)
History Impossible: Narrating and Motivating the Past
I might…expect that the cause of excluding me from England should be frankly 
and fairly stated for my own consideration and guidance. However, I will not 
grumble about the matter. I shall know the whole story one day, I suppose; and 
perhaps, as you sometimes surmise, I shall not ﬁ nd there is any mighty matter 
in it after all. (29)
The protagonist of Walter Scott’s novel Redgauntlet (1824), Darsie 
Latimer, writes this to a good friend, Alan Fairford, from a journey he 
makes to the borderland between Scotland and England. Darsie, who 
lives in Edinburgh and turns out to be an Englishman, is on a mission 
to ﬁ nd out his family past. The quest for Darsie’s personal past evolves 
into a study of British history, and of the possibilities to write history al-
together. Darsie yearns for proper motivation, “frankly and fairly stated,” 
for the instructions he has been given never to visit England, although 
he also realizes there might not be “any mighty matter in it after all.” 
This thematizes the core feature of the novel, its persistent discussion on 
the motivation, tellability and epistemology of its own story. The reader 
encounters both explicit commentary on and implicit allusions to the 
past events for her “consideration and guidance” to make sense of. I have 
nothing to grumble about about that, but rather to investigate what the 
mighty matter here might be. The reader of Scott’s novel, much like Alan 
in the storyworld, ﬁ nds her expectations both conﬁ rmed and subverted 
at times—a feature once suggested as accounting for the fascination of 
ﬁ ction (see Tammi 47).
But there is more for the reader to encounter than for the protagonist 
Alan. As Henrik Skov Nielsen has pointed out, narrative ﬁ ction contains 
an inherent tension: whereas narrative etymologically suggests knowing, 
ﬁ ction rather alludes to invention (275). This question is, of course, 
even more pressing as far as historical ﬁ ction is concerned. The genre is 
deﬁ ned by the reference the storyworld has to historical knowledge (see 
Maxwell 545). As I have suggested elsewhere (Hatavara, “Contested”), 
this reference is far from straightforward, and, for example, contesting a 
known version of history is one of the possible ways to make the reader 
154
of historical ﬁ ction pay attention to the storyworld and its connection to 
history. Furthermore, I indicate that despite the link the storyworld has 
to reality, the modes of narrating do not correspond with those in real 
life storytelling situations. This matter, only touched upon in my previous 
article, is the main focus here: what are the distinctively ﬁ ctional means 
of narrating used in historical ﬁ ction. These, if compared to face-to-face 
communication and everyday storytelling situations, include narrative acts 
with idiosyncratic impossibilities or illogicalities for the reader to enjoy 
and investigate.
The question about the (possible, some would say) distinctiveness of 
ﬁ ction has been addressed lately in the context of natural or unnatural 
narratives and narratology. The natural/unnatural-distinction has been 
deﬁ ned in several ways. Some of the known advocates for the unnat-
ural narrative discussion, namely Jan Alber, Stefan Iversen, Henrik Skov 
Nielsen and Brian Richardson, have in a joint article divided unnatu-
ralness into three aspects: unnatural storyworlds, unnatural minds and 
unnatural acts of narration (116). The ﬁ rst one is not my interest here, 
but the second and third ones are—these two are also intertwined, which 
can be detected in the very reasoning of Alber and the others. The biggest 
issue concerning unnatural minds they wrestle with is the coherence and 
continuousness of a constructed human mind in ﬁ ction, which in the 
mentioned article pretty much boils down to the question of the rela-
tionship between the narrating and the narrated self in ﬁ rst person narra-
tive (121, 123–24). Then again, according to Alber, Iversen, Nielsen and 
Richardson, acts of narration may become unnatural by being physically, 
logically, mnemonically or psychologically impossible (124). According 
to many theories of mind, the psychological impossibility would also in-
clude the breaking of the continuous consciousness assumption between 
the narrating and the narrated self, which is the aspect number two in 
the argumentation of Alber and the others. Thus, both second and third 
versions of unnaturalness are about the relationship between discourse 
and story, and more precisely between enunciators and existences.
The rule of thumb is, I believe, the statement clearly formulated by 
Dorrit Cohn according to which “a work of ﬁ ction itself creates the world 
to which it refers by referring to it” (Distinction 13). This entails the 
synchronicity and interdependence of the act of telling and the existence 
of the told. This rule does, however, come with a twist in historical ﬁ c-
tion: the synchronous story–discourse relation is supplemented by the 
intertextual link the reader builds between the story and the previously 
encountered representations of the same historical events. Hence the nar-
rative motivation may take forms associated with historical writing. This 
does not, however, prevent the use of narrative modes alien to histori-
Mari Hatavara
155
ography proper and distinctive to ﬁ ctional discourse. My examples in this 
article are Scott’s Redgauntlet and I, Claudius (1934) by Robert Graves.
The two novels both have a narrator posing as a historian, even 
though they otherwise manifest narrative strategies far apart: Redgauntlet 
has a third person narrator with varying focalization, but also contains 
many letters and journal entries. I, Claudius is narrated solely by one 
ﬁ rst person narrator, who identiﬁ es himself as an autobiographer already 
at the beginning. Redgauntlet is set in history fairly close to the time of 
writing the novel, during the summer of 1765, and actually describes 
conjectural history, a Jacobite rebellion that never took place. Claudius the 
self-acclaimed autobiographer recounts the history of the Roman Empire 
from Julius Caesar’s assassination to Calicula’s assassination around the 
beginning of the Christian era.
In this article, I will concentrate on the narrative means with which 
these novels are offered as historical narratives. Epistemological veriﬁ -
cation and the ensuring of reader engagement in these novels revolves 
around three questions, which will be addressed in the following order: 
ﬁ rstly, narrative embedding, secondly, the relationship between the nar-
rating and the narrated, and thirdly, the question of narrative communi-
cation. Although my discussion is genre and case speciﬁ c, I believe these 
novels pose questions with broader relevance to narrative theory about 
the speciﬁ city of ﬁ ctional narrative and the ways of studying it. Telling, 
experiencing and reﬂ ecting past and history offer the reader a rich inter-
pretative range of insights into ﬁ ction’s communicative structure.
Narrators and Narrative Levels
It is a critical commonplace to distinguish ﬁ ction from history by point-
ing out that whereas in historiography the narrator and the author are the 
very same person, in ﬁ ction they are undoubtedly separate (see Genette, 
Fiction 69–78; Cohn, Distinction 123–31). This does not prevent many 
ﬁ ctional narrators from presenting themselves as authors, as the narrators 
of Redgauntlet and I, Claudius do. In historical ﬁ ction this is, one could 
think, an easy strategy to offer a natural frame of telling: a historian 
giving an account of true events. Yet ﬁ ctional embeddedness, be it in the 
form of many manifest narrators or incorporated in one explicit narrative 
instance, is crucial to historical ﬁ ction. The multiplicity of the past can 
be conveyed through the indirect communication involved: narrators and 
characters speak to different narrative audiences on different narrative 
levels. It is the reader’s task and privilege to navigate through different 
audience positions offered in the text.
History Impossible
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In Redgauntlet the third person narrator comments on the different 
narrative modes as he makes his ﬁ rst appearance. This occurs in the novel 
only after thirteen letters, and the narrator points out the advantages of 
epistolary narration, but maintains that third person narrative is needed 
to inform readers: 
The advantage of laying before the reader, in the words of the actors themselves, 
the adventures which we must otherwise have narrated in our own, has given 
great popularity to the publication of epistolary correspondence, as practiced by 
various great authors, and by ourselves in the preceding chapters. Nevertheless, 
a genuine correspondence of this kind (and Heaven forbid it should be in any 
respect sophisticated by interpolations of our own!) can seldom be found to 
contain all in which it is necessary to instruct the reader for his full compre-
hension of the story. (141)
Redgauntlet and its use of authorial narrator’s commentary has been dis-
cussed by Harry E. Shaw in an article about historical ﬁ ction. Shaw calls 
for serious, realistic description of history, and deems the use of the nar-
rator’s self-reﬂ exive, metaﬁ ctional commentary in the quoted extract to 
be Scott’s way of undermining himself as an author (179, 182–83). Ac-
cording to this interpretation, Scott ﬂ aunts his shifts from one narrative 
mode to another and emphasizes the way in which they may undermine 
reliability. It is true that the fabricated element of the letters is emphasized 
here—the reader is reminded that these letters are designed to tell a story. 
But does that indicate a failure to take plot and narration seriously, as 
Shaw sees it? In this regard, a discussion by James Phelan on unreliability 
provides another angle. Phelan makes evident that the focus has too much 
been on the estranging effects of unreliability, and the contrary effects of 
bonding unreliability have been overlooked. This is the kind of unrelia-
bility which brings the unreliable narrator closer to the authorial audience.
Phelan introduces six types of bonding unreliability, and the second 
type is of special interest here (“Estranging” 226–32). Phelan calls it 
“playful comparison between implied author and narrator.” In Redgauntlet 
the third person authorial narrator’s expressed doubt about the ability of 
the modes used to convey a full picture of the past for the reader does 
raise the question of reliability. But it also makes the authorial audience 
sympathetic towards the narrator, as he admits his inability to depict the 
characters as accurately as they appear in their own words.1 Furthermore, 
the narrator strongly expresses his commitment to giving his audience 
1 Richard Walsh has discussed Scott’s way of negotiating authorial control especially in his 
prefaces (136–37). In The Fortunes of Nigel (1822), for example, he ﬁ nds Scott practicing 
pre-emptive self-criticism. This is another means to build and maintain the narrator–au-
dience relationship.
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the best possible insight into the events depicted. This makes it evident 
that the narrator is aware of the epistemological problems inherent in 
both homo- and heterodiegetic modes of narration and will do his best 
to overcome them for the beneﬁ t of the readers. This good-will creates a 
bond between the narrator and the authorial audience. Thus self-reﬂ ec-
tion serves to build and maintain a mimetic interpretation of the story-
world as something to be reﬂ ected upon.
This bond between the narrator and the authorial audience is, of 
course, subject to the reader’s interpretation of other elements in the novel. 
Phelan’s model for narrative communication suggests a difference between 
the narrative audience, who trusts the narrator and takes the world depic-
ted as real, and the authorial audience, who concentrates on the artistic 
means, the synthetic element of ﬁ ction, and the interplay between dif-
ferent aspects in an artistic whole (Reading 5–6, 8; Living 18–21). Both 
audience positions with corresponding mimetic and synthetic interpretive 
inclinations are needed in order for the reader to participate in the illusion 
of the storyworld and to understand the novel as a literary artifact.
It is evident that in Redgauntlet the narrator’s declaration about the 
originality of the letters and the absence of modiﬁ cations only holds true 
inside the mimetic language game of the novel. Moshe Ron characterizes 
literary language as bearing semblance to true discource, and from time 
to time as simulating the truth conditions of truth-oriented statements in 
a probable way (18–20). Ron refers to realistic motivation, which warrants 
any aspect of the story to be explainable in terms of why and how. He 
points out that such motivation typically is not present in the text. This 
agrees with Gérard Genette’s formulation on vraisemblance and motiva-
tion (240–43). According to Genette, the further away from the common 
understanding of a supposed audience the motivation of a story is, the 
more it requires explicit motivation in the form of overt comments—and 
vice versa: events that follow shared maxims do not need explicit motiva-
tion.
Ron’s argumentation vis-à-vis Genette’s argumentation has an im-
portant difference: whereas Genette concentrates on how a story with 
unusual story contents is motivated, Ron adds two other probability fac-
tors besides characters and events: epistemic motivation, which calls for 
perceivers and perception, and semiotic motivation, which calls for writers 
and texts (20–25). To follow Ron’s line of thought, the third person nar-
rator in Redgauntlet very openly calls for semiotic, and secondarily also 
epistemic motivation: he has quoted, and will continue to quote, letters 
and journals by the people who are in the midst of the action. Hence the 
letters both function as pieces of evidence about the source of the story, 
and are able to provide a perspective on the past experience.
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The letters, on their part, often include epistemic motivation, as the 
writer explains from whom and on what occasion he has got the infor-
mation he delivers—while he at the same time freely capitalizes mne-
monic overkill (see Cohn, Transparent 162) with word by word citations 
from long dialogues. This is particularly striking when Darsie writes to 
Alan, and includes in the letter a tale orally told to him by a man called 
Wandering Willie: the story imitates Willie’s dialect, and it includes itself 
parts of a dialogue Willie had heard, where the enunciators are occa-
sionally marked only by their name, typographically separated by italics 
and placed at the beginning of a row. The tale is, according to Darsie, 
faithfully quoted: “I will not spare you a syllable of it” (102), he writes. 
Thus the narrative utilizes modes mnemonically impossible, while at the 
same time remarking the origin of each piece of information.
The conventional unnaturalness here lies in the ability of both Willie 
and Darsie to reiterate word for word conversations and stories they have 
heard. Thus the content is warranted by epistemic motivation, but the 
textual speciﬁ city is not—it has to be reckoned under the ﬁ ctional tradi-
tion of impossible sentences and perhaps also impossible typography: the 
italics that indicate the name of the speaker do not originate from Willie 
experiencing them or telling them, but are solely a feature of Darsie’s 
text. Redgauntlet builds up into a manifold construction of embedded 
narratives, where the origin of each piece of information is openly laid 
out—that is, the epistemological motivation is carefully given. The whole 
novel becomes epistemologically motivated at the end, where a scholar 
named Dr. Dryasdust turns out to be the founder and provider of the 
letters and diaries quoted in the novel.2 The novel ends with a chapter 
titled “Conclusion by Dr. Dryasdust in a Letter to The Author of Waver-
ley” (400–02). It is addressed to the author of the novel (Scott used the 
pseudonym Author of Waverley) by a professional historian, who, besides 
referring to the written material he has sent to the author, veriﬁ es many 
of the events of the novel and gives some information about events that 
succeeded the end of the narrative. Yet, on many occasions, the textual 
delivery in the story world (Willie quoting dialogues in his oral story 
and Darsie writing the whole story afterwards) surmounts normal human 
capacity. Additionally, the letters of the characters manifest features like 
redundant telling (cf. Phelan, Living 12), which will be analyzed in the 
next chapter.
2 Jonas Dryasdust appears in several novels by Scott, including The Antiquary (1816), 
Ivanhoe (1819), and Peveril of the Peak (1823). The last mentioned is discussed by Walsh 
(137–38).
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The letters at the beginning and at the end of Redgauntlet are several 
steps apart in narrative levels. The novel opens with a direct quotation 
of thirteen letters by the ﬁ rst person narrators, continues as the third 
person narrator’s explanation, and then in the form of journal entries and 
focalized narratives, and ends with the last letter’s narrator’s assertion of 
this all being collected and provided by a historian. On the contrary, I, 
Claudius has a symmetrical beginning and end with the same narrator. 
The novel starts with this assertion:
I, Tiberius Claudius Drusus Nero Germanicus This-that-and-the-other (for I 
shall not trouble you yet with all my titles), who was once, and not so long ago 
either, known to my friends and relatives and associates as ‘Claudius the Idiot’, 
or ‘That Claudius’, or ‘Claudius the Stammerer’, or ‘Clau-Clau-Claudius’, or at 
best ‘Poor Uncle Claudius’, am now about to write this strange history of my 
life; starting from my earliest childhood and continuing year by year until I 
reach the fateful point of change where, some eight years ago, at the age of ﬁ fty-
one, I suddenly found myself caught in what I may call the ‘golden predicament’ 
from which I have never since become disentangled. (9)
The enunciating “I” with the many names, nicknames and titles—some 
of them not disclosed—claims here the authorial position of the following 
narrative. He also addresses the reader in a friendly manner as “you,” the 
direct addressee, and declares he will refrain from burdening her with 
too much information. At the same time this withholding of informa-
tion provokes, anticipation: what are the titles not yet disclosed, and this 
“golden predicament” mentioned. This play is, of course, only illusionary, 
because the reader will have the historical knowledge of the missing title 
“Caesar.”3
Claudius the narrator outlines a communicative situation in the ﬁ rst 
chapter. A few pages after declaring his intention to write his history, 
Claudius tells about a prophecy according to which this book of his will 
be discovered about 1900 years after it is written, and that he addresses 
the book accordingly—in this way the book is claimed to be written 
by Claudius, but still to be addressed to the reading public of the time 
Graves wrote the novel. The novel declares an unusual communicative 
situation, where the intended audience is marked, but behind a long tem-
poral distance. Claudius the historian both has his cake and eats it: he is 
3 Leona Toker has discussed reticence as gaps in fabula information: narrative gaps depend 
on the reader’s estimation of the completeness of the information given at any moment 
of reading (5–7). As stated above, the dynamics of withholding information change in 
historical novels, where the reader’s intertextual historical knowledge plays a signiﬁ cant 
part (see also Hatavara, “Rhetoric” 32–35). 
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a contemporary witness to the events, and yet self-consciously speaks to 
the generations to come—seemingly to the reader of the novel.
According to the same manner I, Claudius ends with Claudius’ dec-
laration of himself as a historian. He has now involuntarily been made 
Caesar, but ﬁ nds solace in the opportunities this provides for reaching all 
the archives and ﬁ nding out the truth about many events and “twisted 
stories”. He concludes:
What a miraculous fate for an historian! And as you will have seen, I took full 
advantage of my opportunities. Even the mature historian’s privilege of setting 
forth conversations of which he knows only the gist is one that I have availed 
myself of hardly at all. (396)
This conclusion pairs with the beginning: whereas the beginning mo-
tivates the narrative as being based on lived experience, which creates 
epistemic motivation, this end conjures semiotic motivation through his-
torical documents. Yet the assertions of telling about one’s own life and 
not conjuring up discussions do not hold to the narrative practice of the 
novel. These comments suggest historical accuracy and documentation, 
but the narrator does not, however, conﬁ ne himself to the role of a char-
acter narrator, but has several extraordinary abilities, which I will study 
in the next chapter. The discrepancies between explicit commentary and 
narrative modes are essential in the interpretation of both these novels. 
Just as unreliability may be estranging or bonding, other narrative means 
may take on multiple functions.
Narrating and the Narrated
The beginning of the novel I, Claudius discloses an important feature 
of the narrating I: his many roles and masks, indicated by the many 
mock-names. The historical ﬁ gure Claudius, who became emperor at a 
fairly late age, is believed to have suffered from cerebral palsy or Tour-
ette’s syndrome: he limped, he drooled, stuttered and was constantly ill. 
Family members mistook these physical disabilities as reﬂ ective of mental 
inﬁ rmity, and kept Claudius mostly out of the social life. It has also been 
suspected that Claudius magniﬁ ed these symptoms in order to appear 
harmless and avoid being killed as a rival to the throne. Accordingly, 
the novel’s Claudius is a master of disguises and a utilizer of multiple 
narrative modes.
The readerly expectations raised by the opening of the novel are sur-
passed in terms of the story content. The reader is led to look for an 
autobiographical narrative about Claudius’ life (“this strange history of 
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my life” [9]). This is, however, not the case, since the story begins well 
before Claudius’ birth, and mostly depicts important events in the public 
life, which Claudius is not much part of. Most emphasis is put on many 
conspiracies during the reign of Augustus, Tiberius and Caligula. Only 
on few occasions does Claudius tell about his feelings or thoughts, but 
mostly relates the events like a historian, distanced from these events. 
Throughout the novel Claudius in many ways resembles a heterodiegetic 
narrator, with similar epistemological and discursive possibilities over the 
other characters. Claudius the narrator possesses all but one of the traits 
of an omniscient narrator William Nelles lists. Nelles suggests omnis-
cience to be a ﬂ exible notion with several features an author may use to 
her ends (119–21). These features include omnipotency, omnitemporality, 
omniprecency and telepathy. Claudius is not omnipotent: actually quite 
the opposite, he has very little power over what happens to himself or to 
others, and does on many occasions lament that. According to Nelles, 
omnipotent narrators present themselves as creators of the ﬁ ctional world, 
and hence have the ability to make happen anything they want.
As Nelles himself points out, omnipotency really isn’t an attribute of 
omniscience, but entails it (120). It may also be noted, that the extradie-
getic narrators in I, Claudius and in Redgauntlet may not want to pose 
as the inventors of the storyworld, as they are doing their best to assert 
the reader of historical accuracy. Thus this lack of omnipotency is not a 
restriction imposed upon these narrators, but a strategy adopted to main-
tain the illusion of semiotic motivation of the storyworld.  An analogical 
structure in biblical narratives, where the role of the creator needs to be 
allotted to God, has been pointed out by Meir Sternberg (”Omniscience” 
691). As far as concerns the freedom of moving in space, time and minds 
of other characters, Claudius is well equipped, and only rarely motivates 
his sources of information. 
On one occasion Claudius narrates at length his grandmother Livia’s 
thoughts about her husband Augustus, and even openly declares this in 
the end: “How many mere kings paid tribute to Augustus!…Had not 
Apis, the sacret bull of Memphis, uttered a bellow of lamentation and 
burst into tears? This was how my grandmother reasoned with herself” 
(29). The form of this passage follows free indirect discourse (FID) as 
the narrating Claudius apparently partly follows the emotive and express-
ive language of his grandmother. But where does this language origi-
nate from? We are told that these are the private thoughts of Livia, who 
“reasoned with herself.” So we have a textbook example of the literary 
paradox: narrative ﬁ ction obtains its greatest realistic illusion when it 
narrates in ways unattainable to real human beings, such as depicting the 
inner thoughts of another person (Cohn, Transparent 5–9). Possibly Livia 
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told Claudius later about her reasoning, and Claudius again later wrote 
them down. A little earlier in the novel Claudius explains he has heard 
many things about the actions of his grandmother from herself on her 
death bed (25). But despite this possible epistemological motivation, the 
violations against human knowledge and narrative abilities are as apparent 
as were the ones in Wandering Willie’s tale in Redgauntlet: How could 
the dying Livia remember word for word her thoughts years before? And 
how could Claudius then remember the same words, again years later?
These questions, however, are not the essential ones. More important 
is that Claudius the narrator is free from the subject position of a common 
man, and the novel utilizes ﬁ ction’s possibility to free the discourse from 
the normal anchoring to a stable narrating entity and position—even 
though the narrating Claudius is explicitly homodiegetic (cf. Fludernik, 
Towards 269–310). Monika Fludernik considers this mind-hopping ca-
pacity of a ﬁ rst person narrator an infringement of natural story-telling 
parameters (“New” 621). Yet, as demonstrated by Pekka Tammi’s (41, 47) 
analysis of Vladimir Nabokov’s short story “Recruiting,” this is possible 
and even plausible in ﬁ ctional narratives: their distinction, and appeal, 
lie in the transposition between disclosing and transgressing the natural 
functions of our minds.
What is more, the representation of Livia’s thoughts is overtly lit-
erary and foregrounds its own representational power: it abounds with 
expressivity in its use of exclamations and questions, and openly voices 
that these are the private thoughts of another character. Cohn has point-
ed out that FID (narrated monologue in Cohn) may at times resemble 
a mock-quotation, where the narrator partly imitates the words of the 
character (Transparent 119–20). The rather ironic mock-quotation of what 
Claudius’ grandmother supposedly thought opens up several interpretative 
possibilities and thematizes the blurry relations between voice, knowledge 
and narrative positions.
The freedom to move in time and place is evident in the next example. 
Claudius tells about an incident where an esteemed senator, Calpurnius, 
sues Urgulania because of an unpaid debt. Urgulania has a superior posi-
tion as a favourite of Livia, who is wife of the late Augustus, and mother 
of Caesar Tiberius.
When Urgulania read the summons, which was for her immediate attendance at 
the Debtor’s Court, she told her chair-men to take her straight to Livia’s Palace. 
Calpurnius followed her and and was met in the hall by Livia, who told him to 
be off. Calpurnius courteously but ﬁ rmly excused himself, saying that Urgulania 
must obey the summons without fail unless too ill to attend, which clearly she 
was not. Even Vestal Virgins were not exempt from attendance at court when 
subpoenaed. Livia said that his behaviour was personally insulting to her and 
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that her son, the Emperor, would know to avenge her. Tiberius was sent for and 
tried to smooth things over, telling Calpurnius that Urgulania surely meant to 
come as soon as she had composed herself after the sudden shock of the sum-
mons, and telling Livia that is was no doubt a mistake, that Calpurnius certainly 
meant no disrespect, and that he himself would attend the trial and see that 
Urgulania had a capable counsel and a fair trial. (223)
This extract, without the frame of Claudius posing as a ﬁ rst person 
narrator, would fall into a conventional heterodiegetic narration, with 
epistemological and discursive privileges such as FID, mixing the nar-
rator’s discourse with the discourses of Calpurnia, Livia and Tiberius in 
turns. An interesting observation may also be made about the storyworld: 
Tiberius the Emperor is talking to two people separately and in secrecy 
from each other, even if they all share the same space. Like characters in 
a play, Tiberius changes his tone from one to another, and the other char-
acters don’t see or hear what happens under their very eyes. Furthermore, 
what Claudius declares Tiberius to have told to Calpurnius includes an 
assumption about Urgulania’s thoughts and intentions. The last sentence 
does not actually manifest a mind-reading ability of Tiberius, but an in-
tentionally false depiction of Urgulania’s aims and motivations. Still this 
false mock-quotation, heavily modiﬁ ed by the teller (cf. Cohn, Transpar-
ent 119–20),4 suggests an original—even though never existent—feeling 
of Urgulania: the ”sudden shock,” which again Tiberius tries to convey 
she ”surely” had, and now needs to recover from. Here the question of 
unnatural acts of narration or unnatural voices comes in layers and pen-
etrates diegetic levels: not only the narrating Claudius but also other 
characters allegedly know and represent each other’s thoughts.
In some cases, Claudius refers to himself as Claudius, alternatively 
with I: “You may be sure, though, that it caused poor Claudius the 
greatest possible grief,…How was I to know that it was Clement who had 
been killed” (171). Claudius the teller is clearly separated from Claudius 
the character, although the pronoun “I” refers to both. The epistemologi-
cally privileged position of the narrating I over the narrated younger self 
is prominent as the ignorance of the latter is emphasized by a rhetorical 
question. This discursive and epistemological anchoring into the moment 
of telling is further emphasized by addressing the extradiegetic audience 
directly as “you.” Then again, many passages, where Claudius speaks 
about his earlier self as I blend the frames of telling and experiencing. In 
the next extract Caligula the emperor has just ordered Claudius to marry 
4 See also Daniel P. Gunn about the prevalence of the narrator in FID.
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a young girl called Messalina, and Claudius relates this to his long time 
companion, the prostitute Calpurnia.
I told her [Calpurnia] that the marriage was forced on me and that I would 
miss her very much indeed. But she pooh-poohed that: Messalina had twice her 
looks, three times her brains, and birth and money into the bargain. I was in 
love with her already, Calpurnia said.
I felt uncomfortable. Calpurnia had been my only true friend in all those 
four years of misery. What had she not done for me? And yet she was right: I 
was in love with Messalina, and Messalina was to be my wife now. There would 
be no place for Calpurnia with Messalina about.
She was in tears as she went away. So was I. I was not in love with her, 
but she was my truest friend and I knew that if ever I needed her she would be 
there to help me. I need not say that when I received the dowry money I did 
not forget her. (381)
Claudius speaks to several audiences here. In terms of classical speech 
category approach (see Palmer 9–13, 53–57) the ﬁ rst sentence could loosely 
be interpreted as indirect discourse, where the telling I is summarizing 
what he said in the past—or as free indirect discourse, especially in the 
light of the (excessively) reassuring choice of words “very much indeed.” 
The second sentence again comes close to FID, with the words of the 
telling I mixed with the words or thoughts of either Calpurnia or the 
experiencing I. It is most probably Calpurnia who points out the superior 
qualities of Messalina, her looks, brains, birth and money, as she has just 
“pooh-poohed” Claudius’ attempt to assure her of his affection for her. 
The second paragraph, from the second sentence on, comes closest to FID 
in this passage, if we consider—which I, Claudius seems to suggest—FID 
to be possible in ﬁ rst person narration. The telling I and the experi encing 
I act as a narrator and a character. The narrator changes the tense to 
the past, but remains an “I,” only a later version. One deviation from 
traditional FID can be discerned: the change from a presumable original 
of “these four years” to “those four years.” Whereas the persistent pronoun 
“I” reduces the narrator’s visibility and perspective here, this change of 
pronoun, on the contrary, brings the narrator again to the fore. This 
categorization makes clear that the narrating I and the experiencing I 
both differ from and intermingle with each other in many ways. Thus 
Claudius discursively shifts not only between ﬁ rst and third person modes 
of narrating, but also between dissonant and consonant ﬁ rst person 
narrative (see Cohn, Transparent 143–72).
From a cognitively inspired narratological point of view, the frames of 
experiencing and telling (cf. Fludernik, “Natural” 244–47) are of interest 
here. In the ﬁ rst paragraph, does the narrator read the mind of Calpurnia 
or does he cite her words? The second paragraph is even more interesting: 
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is it the experiencing I organizing his thoughts at the moment when he 
“feels uncomfortable,” or is it the telling I reﬂ ecting his former thoughts 
and speculations? It seems like the experiencing I is trying to grasp the 
reality by narrativizing it, organizing his thoughts by rational reasoning, 
and that the telling I is at least trying to reach his former thoughts and 
feelings. This indeterminacy and overlapping of the frames of telling and 
experiencing has been discussed by Maria Mäkelä in some short stories 
by Richard Ford. Her important observation is that literary minds al-
ways merge the representation with the represented. In Claudius’ case this 
means that experiencing and telling are simultaneously present in both 
the past and the present of telling.
But how about rhetorics—and who are the audiences? Who is the 
narrator telling to at which point? In the ﬁ rst two paragraphs, it seems 
like he is reasoning with himself, or trying to explain his reasons to an 
audience who would read his history later. In the last paragraph, espe-
cially at the end, the audience is addressed more directly and from a later 
time point, as the narrator refers to later events. Claudius is overtly and 
self-declaredly a protean character, someone, who at the beginning deﬁ nes 
himself in terms of how people used to call him. This also includes an 
overt assertion of dissonance: “I was known” (9; my emphasis). Through-
out the narrative Claudius not only exercises narrative liberties associated 
with omniscient narration, but he also takes two roles in the storyworld 
and oscillates between them: Claudius, the man of letters, who is witty 
and knowledgeable—and a capable historian—and Claudius the clumsy 
stutterer, who feels alienated in the world and is incapable of expressing 
himself. The story of the novel illustrates and thematizes the need to 
understand the occasion and to adjust one’s story accordingly. The cir-
cumstances in the court are ever-changing with mentally unstable emper-
ors, who have declared themselves to be Gods or semi-Gods. On many 
occasions Claudius survives because he is able to draw quick conclusions 
about bizarre situations – and also to lead others to interpret situations in 
a manner favorable to him. In this sense the story thematizes the power of 
narrative as a cognitive tool for mastering reality. But, on the other hand, 
this is all just a game (also) in the storyworld, and the characters quickly 
change their narratives whenever necessary. Thus the story mocks efforts 
to make sense of the reality by narrativizing it, and depicts those efforts 
as momentary and even meaningless.
Redgauntlet openly discusses the freedom of subjectivity and of speech 
in a line by Redgauntlet himself. Redgauntlet, who turns out to be Dar-
sie’s uncle, declares to Darsie his deep belief in the forces of destiny—even 
though he himself has gone to great trouble to control his nephew’s life 
and future.
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Yes, young man, in doing and suffering, we play the part allotted by Destiny, 
the manager of this strange drama, stand bound to act no more than is pre-
scribed, to say no more than is set down for us; and yet we mouth about free-
will, and freedom of thought and action, as if Richard must not die, or Rich-
mond conquer, exactly where the Author has decreed it shall be so! (212–13)
Taken literally, this would all but ridicule the mimetic language game of 
the novel: how is the novel to portray characters with motifs and aspira-
tions, if they are fully aware of being but masks for the voices the author 
wants to contest. Still, a sounder interpretation takes Redgauntlet not 
really to be aware of himself being a literary character, but to dramatize 
his faith in the powers of destiny by this allusion between people and 
characters in a drama. The reader may interpret this as another joyful 
undermining of authorial privileges, or as a reminder to stay on guard 
for the next move in the mimetic game. Both Redgauntlet and I, Claudius 
have a narrator who wavers between the position of a character and that of 
a narrator. This obscurity has an impact on the communicative structure 
of the narrative.
Narrative Communication
I have demonstrated how Redgauntlet surpasses the natural abilities of its 
narrators by mnemonic (cf. Cohn, Transparent 162) and discursive overkill 
for example in Wandering Willie’s tale. As the novel begins with private 
letters, redundant telling with disclosure functions (cf. Phelan, Living 12) 
is recurrent. The thirteen letters between Darsie and Alan at the begin-
ning of the novel are drafted in a manner that ensures the reader gets the 
relevant information about the characters and events introduced. The ﬁ rst 
letter is rhetorically quite heated, as the protagonist Darsie is irritated by 
the fact that his friend did not join him to an adventure. This gives him 
the opportunity to go over their relationship in past and present, his own 
personal history, and also his hopes for the future. (13–15)
These disclosure functions in the embedded narrative level, followed 
by the extradiegetic reminder of authorial powers—consciously refraining 
from “interpolations”—question the mimetic communicative telling-fra-
me, which Phelan has characterized as “somebody telling somebody else 
on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened” 
(Living 18). The subjects, occasions and purposes do not always neatly 
meet at the same diegetic level. The characters, who are made to carry 
redundant information in their letters, are also made to give excuses for it, 
like Darsie in the ﬁ rst letter: whereas the rendering of their shared past is 
communicatively motivated by Darsie feeling upset about Alan’s behavior, 
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in the case of Darsie’s past the redundancy needs to be overtly moti-
vated. This is achieved, as Darsie explains his repeated telling of the story 
with his effort to “wring some sense out of it.” He also hopes Alan will 
consider his story and its signiﬁ cance. (17) In this manner Redgauntlet’s 
letters thematize the epistolary effort to create a shared space for the writ-
er and the addressee (see Herman 531–32). As Vimala Herman argues, 
epistolary writing itself has a communicative structure at one remove: 
the presence of the addressee is illusionary (529–30, 539–40). The letters 
in Redgauntlet use abundant reference to this epistolary communicative 
situation, for example in the form of addressing ”you,” the receiver. The 
content is however, directed to the reader of the novel.
Tamar Yacobi’s discussion of these instances—redundant telling or 
disclosure function in Phelan’s later terms—adds another important ob-
servation. Yacobi separates rhetorical and ﬁ ctive content in a speaker’s 
discourse: the latter follows the given communcative situation in the 
storyworld, the former denotes the disclosure functions (”Fictional” 123–
26). She sees these disclosure functions as deviating from communicative 
symmetry, and forming overlapping communication, where the embedded 
speaker addresses not only the addressee within the ﬁ ctional world but 
also, even if unwittingly, the reader of the novel. Thus the asymmetric 
communication structure may either be incomplete—there may not be a 
receiver5—or excessive: there are several receivers to one sender.
Like Redgauntlet, I, Claudius also rejects the mimetic, symmetrical 
telling-frame. Both novels defy the deﬁ nition of narrative as communica-
tion with symmetrical sender–receiver pairs. Claudius argues that his con-
temporaries do not understand what he wants to say, but he hopes that the 
future generations several hundred years later will appreciate his history. 
This address from the narrator does not have a corresponding narratee 
in the ﬁ ctional world—the narrator actually denies the sole possibility of 
a contemporary audience. What is more, Claudius as the narrator has a 
variety of teller-functions that cannot be reduced to a single sender person, 
and where the receiving end of the communicative continuum may also 
be lacking: Claudius vacillates between homo- and heterodiegetic posi-
tions, and occasionally reasons with himself in between those. 
Whereas Yacobi used the terms ‘ﬁ ctive’ and ‘rhetorical’ to denote 
narration which either follows or does not follow given communicative 
situation, Phelan in his treatment of redundant telling speciﬁ es between 
narrator functions and disclosure functions, where the former is con-
strained by the narrative situation, and the latter is not (Living 12). While 
5 See also Phelan’s discussion on lyrical narrative (Living 158).
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I ﬁ nd this division to be useful, I still think the terminology is in need of 
revision. With regard to Yacobi’s choice of words, the later development of 
the theory and conceptualization has brought along a risk of confusion: 
the more recent argumentation around the concepts ﬁ ctive, ﬁ ctional and 
rhetorical makes her theory hard to access today. What Yacobi labels 
ﬁ ctive, would be more clearly deﬁ ned under mimetic today—whereas 
mimetic thirty years ago would have been a term too wide to use in this 
meaning, as referring to interpretation faithful to the overt communica-
tive situation. 
Phelan’s terminology, to my mind, has two possible problems. Firstly, 
this distinction between narrator and disclosure functions is at risk of be-
ing mixed with the distinction between narrator and character functions, 
which is a separation on a completely different level of narrative. Secondly, 
and what is more important here, this distinction indicates too narrow an 
understanding of narrative and narrator, equalizing narrator with teller. 
My suggestion is to make the separation between communicative and 
informative functions. I would then propose the overall concept to be 
narratorial functions, and that we divide these into communicative and 
disclosure functions, the ﬁ rst ones abiding to the rules of communication, 
the latter deﬁ ning them. This also gets me back to the discussion about 
natural and unnatural narratives, since the communicative may be called 
natural and the disclosure unnatural narrative functions.
Here my argument comes close to Nielsen’s claim that “one does not 
have to consider all forms of narration as report and communication” 
(279). I do agree, and hope I have demonstrated what this means in 
the novels analyzed in this essay. The reader does not only have possible 
audience positions to choose between, but is confronted with voices whose 
sender–receiver positions are lacking or fuzzy if compared to communica-
tive models. Nielsen suggests a deﬁ nition for unnatural narrative as nar-
ration which is not communication, as opposed to natural oral narratives. 
This seems a plausible move, and one that supplements the idea of ﬁ ction’s 
language being able to displace the origin of the speaker deictically, which 
is discursively exempliﬁ ed in free indirect discourse.
Fiction’s discursive potential, due to its embedded narrative structure, 
has not always been welcomed by theorists of the historical novel. Shaw 
alleges Redgauntlet to be marked by Scott’s frivolous use of history and 
narrative. This is supposedly due to the novel’s use of various narrative 
modes which do not constitute a distinct and coherent story. I claim quite 
the opposite. There is nothing frivolous in using several narrative modes 
in order to convey history; on the contrary, these modes enable a fuller 
picture of the past depicted, and encourage reader evaluation of the story 
and discourse. From my position, the problem—if there is one—with 
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Redgauntlet is precisely the opposite from what Shaw is concerned about. 
The problem is that towards the end of the book the third person narra-
tor increasingly takes over the narrative. The narrative mode moves from 
letters to a journal, then to internally focalized third person narrative and 
ﬁ nally to third person narrative with zero focalization. This has a negative 
impact on the bond which the authorial audience has formed with the 
ﬁ rst-person narrators, who as characters also act as focalizers.
In Redgauntlet the reader is ﬁ rst acquainted with the past world 
through and with the people who experience it. Then, step by step, the 
narrative moves away from the experienced story-time to the retrospec-
tive discourse-time. This development culminates in the last chapter’s 
letter to the author of the narrative just presented. Thus the audience 
positions gradually move closer to the position of the real reader, who, 
in the end, is left at the same point where she started. After forming a 
bond with the characters as narrators and actors in the past, the autho-
rial audience is taken back to the distant temporal and epistemological 
position. It seems like the novel, after all, demonstrates mistrust in the 
reader’s capacity to navigate between different points of time and diffe-
rent audience positions in the process of making sense of the past and 
participating in the understanding of history. Still, Redgauntlet exempli-
ﬁ es the possibilities of ﬁ ctional embedding and several narrative voices 
to mediate, and also to thematize, different temporal positions involved 
in writing history.
As Jonathan Culler has indicated, knowing is a very relative or even 
irrelevant issue as far as ﬁ ction is concerned (23–24). Fictional discourse 
may or may not be assigned to a dramatized teller person, but always ori-
ginates in the implied author. Character-narrators represent the storyworld 
they live in, but all kinds of narrative voices, I claim, convey information 
that constitutes the storyworld and its characters. In this creation, even if 
the aim is to compose an illusion of a storyworld mimetically resembling 
our own, the unnatural or synthetic elements of ﬁ ction are crucial. 
In the End
According to natural narratology, the process of narrativization, mak-
ing sense of narrative ﬁ ction, is founded not only on our experience of 
everyday life, but also on our experience with ﬁ ction’s generic properties 
(cf. Fludernik, “Natural” 244). This is a feature of the theory worth 
more attention than it has received so far. Fiction, be it natural or unnat-
ural, is part of our everyday life and experience. Both Redgauntlet and I, 
Claudius present a protagonist who is not only a conscious teller character 
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but also an experiencer and reﬂ ector of his life through literary models. 
Claudius takes the majority of his examples from historical literature, 
enriched by stories like the Horse of Troy (325). Darsie mostly resorts 
to Shakespeare and romantic literature, folk tales and sayings of famous 
contemporary people, but also to general ideas about, for example, the 
functions and centrality of plot—for instance, by proclaiming “[t]he plot 
thickens, Alan” (90). These or other explicit comments by the narrators 
do not, however, indicate that either of the novels would be solely or 
even mostly about metaﬁ ctional play—rather they are attempts to narrate 
history in a meaningful fashion. The reader’s effort to interpret the text 
with incongruences between explicit commentary and the narrative tools 
implemented requires the same kind of activity the characters utilize in 
testing different models of understanding, be their origin in the reader’s 
lived or read experience. 
Yacobi’s suggestion for interpreting self-contradictions in a given text 
includes ﬁ ve principles: the genetic, the generic, the existential, the func-
tional and the perspectival (“Fictional” 114–19). In recent narratological 
argumentation the existential (the ﬁ ctive world) and to some extent the 
perspectival (the observer of the ﬁ ctive world) have gained much atten-
tion—compare, for example the signs of unnatural narrative quoted at 
the beginning of this article. What seems to be perhaps the one master 
principle above the others is the functional one. As Yacobi maintains,
“[t]he work’s aesthetic, thematic and persuasive goals invariably oper-
ate as a major guideline to making sense of its peculiarities” (117). She 
also makes evident that the principles she gives do not operate separately 
but come in mixtures and as interpretative options. Formal patterns can 
serve a number of different effects, and vice versa (Yacobi, “Package” 
223; Sternberg, “Proteus”; “Omniscience” 687–88; cf. Phelan, Living 68), 
which has been eloquently exempliﬁ ed by Phelan’s discussion on bonding 
unreliability (see also McCormick 324–34).
But, what is more, it is not the product but the process of making 
sense of narrative ﬁ ction which is of essence. Tammi demonstrates how 
ﬁ ction may “teeter between mutually exclusive, impossible narrative op-
tions” (51); likewise, Cohn calls for recognizing the certain “two-minded-
ness” inherent in the interpretation of ﬁ ctional narratives, where the reader 
is left wavering between two possible solutions (”Discordant” 309). This 
teetering and wavering I have tried to demonstrate in my analyses of 
Redgauntlet and I, Claudius. It applies to the position and the abilities of 
the narrators, be they in relation to the narrated or to the audiences, and 
is precisely the reason for the analysis. Darsie the correspondent writes 
to Alan:
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I continue to scribble at length, though the subject may seem somewhat deﬁ cient 
in interest. Let the grace of the narrative, therefore, and the concern we take in 
each other’s matter, make amends for its tenuity. We fools of fancy, who suffer 
ourselves, like Malvolio, to be cheated with our own visions, have, nevertheless, 
this advantage over the wise ones of the earth, that we have our whole stock of 
enjoyments under our own command, and can dish for ourselves an intellectual 
banquet with most moderate assistance from external objects. (118)
Narratives like Redgauntlet or I, Claudius offer rich material for literary 
scholars, who may go on to dish themselves one intellectual banquet after 
another, even upon the smallest detail in these narratives. This scrib-
bling is what we do, more or less gracefully. This is why, even though I 
agree with Nielsen’s observation about the need to exclude the necessity 
of communication from narrative (296–99), I disagree with his suggestion 
that this would make the real ﬂ esh-and-blood author pivotal. Nielsen 
concludes that “[t]o realize the full potential of authors, we should rather 
‘employ’ than ‘imply’ them” (299). I would much rather have us literary 
scholars realize our full potential as readers of the endlessly intriguing and 
never fully explainable ﬁ ction, be it natural or non-natural, schematic or 
strange, logical or impossible—or all this together.6
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